

Consent, Informal Organization and Job Rewards: a Mixed Methods Analysis*

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Abstract

This study uses a mixed methods approach to workplace dynamics. Ethnographic observations show that the consent deal underlies an informal stratification that divides the workplace into an “informal periphery,” a “conventional core” and an “administrative clan.” The “consent deal” is defined as an exchange of autonomy, voice and schedule flexibility for intensified commitment, and is modeled as a single factor underlying these elements. When constructed as an additive scale, consent allows informal organization to be included in workplace models. Despite its derivation from subjective and informal processes, informal structure exerts an independent effect on objective job rewards such as wages.

Introduction

The workplace is one of the most intensively studied areas in sociology, yet despite a century of studying organizations, we still have only a vague understanding of the dynamics between formal and informal organization, between structure and culture, and between objective and subjective elements. We can enter a workplace and adjust to the culture, identify and work with key informal power brokers, and manipulate that intersubjective dynamic which we know affects workplace outcomes. However, we have yet to fulfill Gouldner's (1959) call for reconciliation between the “rational” and “natural system” models and develop a theoretical framework that would move us from an understanding of the dynamics of a

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workplace to a generalized model of *the workplace*. Without this general model, we can assert but not demonstrate claims that: the formal, structural side of the workplace has a minor role in determining workplace attitudes, or the informal dynamics has a measurable impact on objective outcomes.

This study is about measuring the effects of one important intersubjective dynamic that is observable in the generalized workplace. I take a mixed methods approach: first using ethnographic data to identify the elements of that dynamic, and then using survey data to model it between the structural aspects and job rewards. This key dynamic creates an informal stratification of workers into (a) an *administrative clan*: an elite group that works under normative control and enjoys upper-tier, primary labor market working relations; (b) a *conventional core*: the majority of primary market workers who work under bureaucratic conditions; and (c) an *informal periphery*: whose members work under the harshest “market” relations with the strictest technical or personal control. I identify this dynamic as the “consent deal” — an informal relationship between managers and workers that reflects the intensity by which managers enforce formal work rules and by which workers extend effort on workplace tasks (see Littler and Salaman 1984). The intensity of this dynamic is measured as an exchange of *autonomy*, *schedule flexibility* and *voice* by managers for *organizational commitment* by workers. For each worker, a high level of all elements indicates membership in the administrative clan and a low level of all indicates membership in the extended periphery.

Using these elements, I model the consent deal as a second-order latent factor, then construct an additive scale and measure its distribution between formal workplace levels and occupation types. Finally, I incorporate consent as a measure of the informal intersubjective dynamic within a broader workplace model and test its effects relative to the effects of objective structural factors on job satisfaction, worker identities and wages.

CONSENT

Burawoy’s (1979) conception of workplace consent has been important to analyzing power relations within the workplace. A number of ethnographies since have elaborated on how management generates consent and limits class consciousness (e.g., Hodson et al. 1994; McCabe 1999; Smith 1996). However, these have failed to offer a conception of consent that can be used to broaden the research using statistical modeling. Indeed, studies that have used statistical modeling have deviated from a relational definition in favor of worker-centered measures — e.g., Vallas (1991) used worker perceptions indicative of class consciousness, and Hodson (1999) used organizational citizenship and resistance behaviors.

A more useful approach was offered in Littler and Salaman’s (1984) discussion of control and consent. They begin with the observation that the key factor in

determining organizational structure is the need to convert raw labor power to productive labor (Braverman 1974; Hache 1988), and that this is done through various labor control mechanisms (Edwards 1979). They then echo Burawoy's observation that some process to generate worker compliance must also be designed into the organization of the work process. They recognize that while control is often established through management's work rules and procedures, these rules cannot realistically account for all circumstances that arise in production. A normalized production flow therefore requires some amount of give and take, such as bending rules for extra effort. In fact, workers sometimes engage in a form of resistance called "working to rule" in which they refuse to participate in this give and take, thereby slowing production. This requirement leads Littler and Salaman to characterize real work behaviors and relationships as the result of continual negotiations between workers and their immediate supervisors over interpretations of formal work rules, a flexibility which is offered in exchange for a working commitment to the overall objectives of management. Because this involves an effective suspension of the rules, procedures and regulations around which the formal organization is based, they conclude that consent is developed "outside formal organizational procedures for establishing legitimacy, in what is described as the 'informal' structure of the organization." (1984:68)

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

Organizational theorists since Roethlisberger and Dickson ([1939] 1967) have recognized that informal organization rivals formal organization in its effect on the day-to-day functioning of an enterprise. Subsequent theorists have discussed its importance for organizational dynamics (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Selznick 1949; Thompson 1967), and its effect on enhancing or restricting productivity (e.g., Burawoy 1979; Graham 1971; Mayo 1933; Reif et al. 1973; Roy 1959; Sayles 1963). However, despite this attention, there has been little consensus on how informal organization manifests across organizations. While Roethlisberger and Dickson describe informal organizations as the "actually existing patterns of human interaction" by which the work of the organization is performed ([1939] 1967:559), others characterize it in such terms as the "natural" v. "rational" system (e.g., Selznick 1949; Thompson 1967), "organic" v. "mechanic" model (Burns and Stalker 1961), "culture" (see Ouchi and Wilkins 1985), "negotiated order" (Fine 1984), and "discourse" (Stinchcombe 1990), none of which easily lend themselves to modeling. Lawrence and Seiler (1965:187) approach a usable construction with their discussion of workers as having a "status," which is determined by "position in the informal social organization" but never specifies how that position was determined. Without a clear specification, quantitative work on informal organization has not advanced much beyond network analysis, which reduces it to the number and type of communication links between workers (e.g., Mizruchi 1994; Podolny 1990; Vogel

1968; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988;). This specification has obvious limitations for cross-organizational studies.

Some characteristics of informal groups can be found in the literature. Gouldner (1959:410) acknowledges the ambiguity regarding informal organization by describing it as “a residual or cafeteria concept of diverse and sprawling contents.” He relates the “natural-systems model” (which focuses on informal organization) with his earlier discussion (1954) of “representative bureaucracy,” which he says has its basis in consent. He notes that consent springs from a “consensus of ends and values” (1954:223), and that an important component is worker perception of having “some measure of control over the initiation and administration of the rules.” He also notes that “formal rules gave supervisors something with which they could ‘bargain’ in order to secure informal cooperation from workers” (1954:173) and identifies schedule flexibility as an important bargaining “chip” for informal cooperation.

Other hints can be found in discussions of the informal coalitions that are found within organizations. Thompson describes coalitions as workers who want to “maintain or enhance their positions regardless of the official, authorized positions they hold” (1967:125), and who tend to have high levels of discretion and some voice in enterprise decision-making processes. Similarly, Pfeffer and Salancik’s coalitions consist of workers who are (1) involved in the “enactment of the organization’s environment” — an essential part of decision-making, and (2) driven in part by “the quest for discretion and autonomy.” (1978:261)

Observations of Informal Workplace Stratification

I observed informal stratification and the elements of consent that underlie it while conducting ethnographic observations of Family Finance Corporation (FFC), a family-owned financial enterprise that went public, overextended, and was absorbed by a larger corporation.¹ These observations were made while I worked over four years in several roles: a temporary employee assigned to the company, a part-time computer programmer, a full-time administrator and an outside consultant.² Relevant observations are presented in summary form because the agreement under which management allowed these observations excluded interviews or quotations attributed to members of the workplace. Much of the data therefore consists of natural conversations and incidents observed in the course of my duties. To underscore that people did recognize my dual role as worker and observer, I was given the nickname of “the professor” by my supervisor, and I encouraged its use among coworkers.

FFC had two periods with distinct cultures during the study, before and after its move to a building constructed during its intensive growth phase. When I started, the culture was very informal, with an “organic” management style (per Burns and Stalker 1961), and had working relationships such that all levels of



Figure 1. Apparent Distribution of Administrative Clan, Conventional Core and Informal Periphery among Floors at Site of Case Study

workers intermingled regularly and most people could be expected to do any task. FFC's main office was located in the converted storefronts of a strip mall, and there were no partitions between desks and few between functional areas. There were scores of temporary workers throughout the offices helping with what turned out to be a disastrous manual conversion of account records between computer systems, and these workers were often treated as regular staff.

Just prior to the move to the new building, a new management team was recruited for finance, information systems and personnel functions, and the formation of this team coincided with a change to a more formal, "mechanic" style. Working relationships became much more formal and professionalized. Functional units were separated, workers were given cubicles, managers were given offices, and security procedures were implemented to restrict access to the building by non-employees. Hierarchical distance quickly appeared between management, professionals, clerical staff and temporary workers. The corporation appeared to objectify its new organizational stratification in the distribution of functional units by floor, which I have depicted in Figure 1.

The move to the new building with offices, cubicles and new furniture and equipment signaled a change in culture away from the business's earlier incarnation as an entrepreneurial free-for-all to an established corporation. Workers seemed to take themselves more seriously by dressing more formally and decorating their cubicles and offices in a more "professional" style. The corporation took an active role in developing the culture by implementing a corporate newsletter and staging occasional picnics and holiday parties. Functional units began developing subcultures — traditions, languages and social ties that build unit solidarity.

INFORMAL STRATIFICATION

My duties included developing, installing and troubleshooting computer systems, and these responsibilities allowed me to travel to all social and physical levels of the new building where I was able to observe the transformation in workplace relationships and attitudes. I could see that the informal networks that developed prior to the move didn't completely disappear, but congealed into an informal administrative structure that appeared to shadow the formal structure. I also noted the emergence of an informal polarization that had either been camouflaged or minimized by the earlier culture. This polarization created three groups that were distinguishable, but whose boundaries were continually in flux. I came to call these groups the *informal periphery*, *conventional core* and *administrative clan*. Their distribution within the building (and among functional units) is depicted in the shaded areas in Figure 1.

Informal Periphery

The informal periphery was the “bottom” of the informal structure. Workers in this group appeared to visibly manifest the dissolution of the boundary between temporary and permanent workers described by Smith (1997). Many were either traditional contingent workers (temporary or part-time workers) or permanent workers who were treated as contingent. Their work tasks were well-defined and managerial control was intensive and often antagonistic, whether conducted through direct attention from a supervisor or automated into the technology of their work. These workers were generally given such highly routinized tasks that their contribution came more from attendance than application of a skill set, a stark reality that was reflected in the minimal schedule flexibility they received.

For many workers, this outsider status was temporary, until their general proficiency was recognized to be sufficient to warrant more relaxed supervision or until they were able to demonstrate some level of commitment or skill. However, there appeared to be some workers who were consistently relegated to out-group status. Some of these were simply due to deficient individual performance. Others were due to membership in a racial or ethnic minority or a subordinate work group being assimilated through a merger. Still others simply worked in positions which had experienced such high levels of turnover that incumbents needed to show extraordinary patience or proficiency before any opportunity to improve their situation.

Workers in the informal periphery were rarely acknowledged by management, but when they were they were usually referred to with terms that indicated unreliability and expendability. On one instance when I was walking on the first floor with one of the higher level managers, he told me that these workers were “clock watchers.” Many workers in the informal periphery responded in kind to this treatment, showing low levels of dedication and sometimes evincing minor forms of resistance. For them, the enterprise represented an onerous work environment with few redeeming features beyond a paycheck.

Conventional Core

The majority of workers were in what I called the “conventional core.” These are the workers for whom the formal organizational rules apply. Occupations in this group include everything from clerical to management, but the worker-organization relationships tend to be dominated by bureaucratic concerns. For example, these might be clerical or technical workers who are highly committed, but their autonomy and other work conditions were no different from their less committed colleagues as dictated by their formal position. Similarly, the core also included professionals or managers whose positions gave them very high levels of autonomy, schedule flexibility and input into the organization, but whose

level of commitment — the alignment of interests with the corporation — were relatively low in comparison to their peers.

Administrative Clan

Soon after starting work, and despite my status as a temporary worker, my technical skills and managerial background placed me in an informal technical-administrative group that cut across the organization's functional units and formal hierarchical structures. This group, which I titled the "administrative clan" after Ouchi's (1980) organization type, appeared to operate in the manner of the "coalitions" described by Thompson (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). It centered on management and professional staff, but extended deep into the organization, drawing in workers with critical institutional knowledge or idiosyncratic skills. The group often appeared as a clique or "in-group" of workers at various levels through which the most critical administrative activity seemed to flow. Membership was not necessarily commensurate with structural factors such as formal hierarchical position, formal skill set or tenure.

There were numerous examples of offices in which workers would hold identical job descriptions with the same formal authority, but only one worker would be recognized and treated as part of the clan. Some clan members would have minor differentials in title from workers who were otherwise their peers; however, these differentials apparently served only to legitimize a greater reliance on the "other duties as assigned" clause of their formal job description. One work unit that was given the title of "special projects" was staffed predominantly with clerical clan members who would conduct high priority data entry (or data clean-up) projects to assist any functional unit of the organization. Even this unit was stratified among clerical clan who worked autonomously and clerical non-clan who were more closely supervised.

As noted, identifying members of the clan was generally easy, but specifying characteristics of membership was not. There were no set boundaries between members and non-members nor were there designated rituals defining membership; people moved in and out of the group as their proverbial "star" rose or fell. Membership appeared to take the form of an aura of reliability, as if it had been confirmed by some ordeal. In many cases it had been — some members were known for their willingness to put forth heroic efforts for critical projects, others for their ability to help define or represent some important aspect of organizational culture. All were trusted workers who knew how to manage critical tasks under minimal direction.

One characteristic that seemed important was engagement with corporate cultural activities — regardless of the actual feelings the clan member had toward the activity. Clan members would help plan and even bake special dishes for parties, read and even contribute to the newsletter, and participate in a "vision committee" that appeared to be FFC's equivalent to quality circles.

This reliability and trustworthiness appeared to reflect a sense that the heroic efforts of these workers were motivated by a sincere concern for advancing FFC's interest. Members had aligned their interests so completely with the corporation that, for them, the typical control processes were not necessary. This alignment closely resembled Ouchi's (1979, 1980) clan organization form, but unlike for Ouchi, the alignment applied to this informal group instead of to the organization as a whole. Interestingly enough, my label for this group as the "administrative clan" resonated well for coworkers with whom I discussed the validity of the concept.

WORKPLACE POLARITY

The administrative clan and informal periphery embody a number of workplace polarities. Members of the administrative clan tend to be on the "fast track" for promotions, get the highest raises, and have better ties with other supervisors and coworkers, while members of the informal periphery are generally ignored. The correspondence between informal structure and flexibility theory's "core" and "periphery" (e.g., Berger and Piore 1980; McLoughlin and Clark 1988; Osterman 1975; Piore 1971) became apparent in worker responses to staff cuts that were forced by FFC's financial troubles. The business had been closing branch offices for months with little reaction from workers at headquarters because the enterprise was thought to be consolidating work there. However, when almost all of the external branches were cut, headquarters experienced two waves of layoffs. The first wave hit workers at all levels of the formal organization, but was focused on members of the informal periphery. Although this wave included some managers and professionals, survivors were clearly not concerned for their own jobs. When asked about the layoffs of managers and professionals, they replied with statements suggesting that management was merely "cutting dead weight." However, when the second wave of layoffs included administrative clan members (including myself), survivors displayed considerably more concern that the enterprise was in serious trouble and that their own jobs were at risk. An organization that would cut clan members was now seen as being in deep trouble. When I was brought back as a consultant, I was told that each unit was required to give up a staff member, and that I was cut because of my dual commitment to FFC and to my academic research.

In an interesting addendum to the layoffs, as if to underscore the contingent nature of the extended periphery, FFC hired a new cohort of these workers within weeks after the layoffs. When I asked why FFC was simultaneously hiring and laying off workers, Human Resources staff indicated that turnover within these positions was so high that these positions were not considered when making strategic staffing decisions for the enterprise.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION: THE CONSENT DEAL

Despite the three distinct informal strata I observed, there appeared to be an underlying continuum that created “degrees” of clan and periphery as people moved into and out of those groups. This continuum reflected varying levels of consent — a characteristic of the corporation–employee relationship indicating the level of active cooperation in the process of production. However, within this context consent means much more — implying a level of engagement between the worker and the corporation, or at least one of the organizational coalitions that administer the corporation. At its high end this engagement means Ouchi’s clan relations, where control is normative (e.g., Kunda 1992) and maximum effort is assumed, and at the low end the lack of engagement means a relationship of suspicion, where control is technical or direct (Edwards 1979), and supervision is close, leading to the “less reliable” worker performance described by Gouldner (1954:161).

This continuum of engagement is observable in what I refer to as the “consent deal,” based on Littler and Salaman’s (1984) conceptualization of consent as an exchange of relaxed enforcement of rules for alignment of interest. This takes the form of an exchange of perceived *autonomy*, *voice* and *schedule flexibility* for *organizational commitment*, and is as clearly visible in the administrative clan as it is clearly absent in the extended periphery. Perhaps the most important of these offerings from management is the perception of autonomy, which is regularly brought up in the literature as a characteristic of desirable positions. In the administrative clan, even members at non-professional, clerical support levels perceive themselves to have high levels of autonomy more characteristic of professional positions. In the informal periphery, even members of management are closely scrutinized.

The next offering from management is the perceived ability to participate in organizational decisions. Administrative clan members, even from lower formal positions, perceive themselves as influencing the corporation. This influence is not always direct, although they are sometimes asked and are always listened to when offering an opinion. Administrative clan members are aware that they exercise disproportionate influence indirectly by preparing formal reports and participating in information channels which shape management’s conception of organizational issues (i.e., Pfeffer and Salancik’s “enactment process”). On the other hand, periphery members generally learn about decisions and sometimes even the problems they address as the decisions are being implemented. In a more direct application of Hirshman’s (1970) terms, when problems develop, clan members are more comfortable exercising “voice” while peripheral workers are more likely to “exit.”

The third job characteristic in the consent deal is perceived schedule flexibility. For administrative clan members, this often starts with their working long hours

when they are called to help complete time-sensitive projects in exchange for “compensatory time off.” In many cases this flexibility takes the form of clan members not observing strict time rules, as in arriving late or leaving early. Often this flexibility is more perceptual than real, because their commitments as administrative clan require face time at the workplace. This flexibility is best exemplified by a clerical worker in my unit who often had problems finding daycare for her children, especially when she was called in on her days off to work on critical problems. She would occasionally bring her children, and we would set up games on a computer to occupy them as she worked. We would not even have considered this for someone who was not a clan member. My own schedule is another example — I often came in late, but while I was occasionally teased, coworkers recognized that I regularly worked at home. Members of the periphery, either because their contribution comes more from their presence than their skills or because they are under intense pressure from managers, have no such flexibility. If they were “clock watchers” as described by managers, their tardiness and leaving early was being no less closely scrutinized by those same managers.

The fourth characteristic, organizational commitment, is the employee’s contribution to the consent deal. It is critical for clan membership and absent in the informal periphery. Administrative clan members act as if their interests are fully aligned with the enterprise, and give much of themselves to it, often to the detriment of their families and social life. This commitment is regularly tested in extra responsibilities not associated with their formal job duties. For instance, the Information Systems unit at FFC was also responsible for snow removal and administering the building’s cleaning contracts. One clan member in that unit was severely tested when he found that someone on the night shift had defecated on the floor of the executive suites’ restroom. He accepted his responsibility to clean the restroom because the cleaning company could not be called before the executives came in for the day. The incident can also be seen as expression of contempt from peripheral workers, who held the same low regard for the corporation as they felt the business had for them.

The relative level of each of these of these components reflects the extent of the consent deal being made at the individual level. All characteristics are present at high levels for members of the administrative clan, and all are low or absent for the informal periphery. Workers with mismatched or moderate levels are in the undifferentiated mass of the conventional core. A professional or manager who has high levels of autonomy, voice and flexibility but does not return high levels of commitment is not regarded as clan.³ At the other end, a temporary or entry-level worker who works in a very restrictive job but demonstrates a high level of commitment would not be regarded in the same way as members of the informal periphery, and would be more likely to be advanced in formal position before others with more tenure.

This mismatch between the worker's commitment and job characteristics offered informally by management can be seen as indication of a boundary through which workers are moving into and out of the clan or periphery. It also suggests that the direction of effects between job characteristics and commitment actually goes back and forth over time. Workers demonstrating higher commitment than their position warrants are sometimes informally extended greater levels of autonomy, voice and flexibility within their jobs, or might even be promoted to positions with the commensurate characteristics. Perhaps the best example of this was the Special Projects Unit, which offered clerical workers an "elite" status and *very* flexible work rules for working on critical problems that required initiative and creativity.

On the other hand, workers in professional and managerial positions who do not demonstrate commitment commensurate with the levels of autonomy, voice and flexibility that come with their positions often have those characteristics restricted. Three examples illustrate this point. In the first case, a vice president who had been a college friend of the president began making greater demands for money and perks from the enterprise because of a successful project he had initiated. When this did not come quickly, he was found to be secretly negotiating for a position at a rival company. This act of disloyalty overcame his value to the organization so his autonomy, flexibility and authority were severely restricted until he left. In the second case, a new set of managers from a conglomerate that took over the enterprise imposed the same restrictions on the founder and president, and drove him out. Perhaps the best example was the third case of an administrator who was part of the clan for much of the observation period, but who lost status through his declining commitment. His personality was abrasive, and the company moved away from the technology which was his specialty, but his early demonstrations of commitment were sufficient to warrant clan status for most of his tenure. The action which precipitated his fall from the clan and his subsequent dismissal was telling an assistant not to perform some work requested of his unit.⁴ The words least compatible with clan status are the following: "I won't do that — it is not my job."

The Consent Scale

The ethnography demonstrated that an informal structure that is important to organizational dynamics is observable through the four elements of the consent deal: autonomy, voice, schedule flexibility and commitment. I next wondered if this informal workplace dynamic could be observed more generally in statistical models constructed from survey data. This formulation would allow me to test propositions about the relative effects on job rewards of this subjective element and the more traditional structural elements used in workplace models. In the

following, I refer to this subjective element as either “consent” or “informal organization,” depending on the context, but it must be understood that since the consent deal underlies informal organization, I regard them as analytically synonymous — dual sides of the same coin.

The procedure for modeling the consent scale is simple enough, but it first must face a paradigmatic objection that the three elements of the consent deal which are generally regarded as structural characteristics — autonomy, voice and schedule flexibility — are well established as causally prior to subjective states such as the third element — organizational commitment (e.g., Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Mowday, Porter and Steers 1982). This objection is met first by noting that some of the early proponents of structural analysis recognized the subjective nature of these characteristics as outcomes of power struggles (Kalleberg, Wallace and Althausen 1981). Secondly, when obtained from surveys, these characteristics are in reality self-reported subjective perceptions of an individual worker’s situation. Hackman and Lawler (1971) demonstrated that these make good approximations⁵ for objective structural characteristics, but they do not have the consistency or objectivity implied by the paradigm. For example, a worker’s autonomy and schedule flexibility are vulnerable to changes brought on by a change of managers. A job can be completely revamped and incumbents “reined in” by a new manager without making any formal changes to job descriptions or organizational charts. Self-reported job characteristics are also not objective because, when asked to rate their level of autonomy, an administrative clan member in a clerical position might offer the same responses as a manager, creating a perceptual equivalence that belies the very real differences in autonomy between clerks and managers based on the differences in their tasks.

Ultimately however, this paradigmatic concern about levels of causality is resolved by modeling the consent deal as a latent factor operating at a level that is causally prior to and measured by all four subjective or perceptual characteristics — a relationship measured by confirmatory factor analysis.

METHODS AND DATA

The data set used in the model was collected as the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey (Wallace, Jamison and Shin 1996), which was conducted in the summer of 1996 using the facilities of the Center for Survey Research at the Indiana University Institute for Social Research. The IQES resulted in 705 completed cases (64 percent response rate) from across Indiana selected randomly from working adults (defined as people over aged 18 working more than 20 hours per week) employed in non-agriculture jobs. A randomizing procedure for selecting respondents from households ensured against bias on the basis of who answered the telephone. The questions used in constructing measures in this study are presented in the Appendix, arranged by factors which they were initially designed to measure.

One note regarding sample size: because the dynamics of informal organization are different for small organizations (< 10 workers), the model is restricted to organizations with 10 or more workers. This reduced the sample size to 582.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF CONSENT

Given that autonomy, schedule flexibility and organizational commitment are themselves measured as latent factors, consent is modeled as a second-order latent factor underlying these first-order factors. Figure 2 depicts the model with parameter estimates. The number of cases for this model is 557 due to list-wise deletion of missing values. Estimates are computed by AMOS 3.62 using asymptotically distribution-free estimators to compensate for distribution problems caused by categorical variables. (See Bollen 1989; Kline 1998.) The original model included *freedom* as a third measure of *autonomy* (see Appendix), but that produced fit statistics which indicated that the model did not fit the data ($\chi^2 = 51.2$, $df = 32$, $p = .016$). By dropping *freedom*, the fit statistics supported the assertion that the revised model fits the data ($\chi^2 = 21.2$, $df = 24$, $p = 0.63$). Even though this left two indicators for *autonomy*, the model is still identified per Kline (1998:235). Cronbach's coefficient ($\alpha = .74$) indicates that this is a reliable measure for consent.

DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

A more useful form for *consent* is an additive scale in which the items are weighted by the paths from the latent factor (see Figure 2). Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) offer several statistics to test the suitability of composite scales. With these data, their invalidity statistic for *consent* ($\Psi < .01$) verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic ($\rho_{TS} = .88$) shows a high correlation between the scale and the underlying factor, and along with their reliability statistic⁶ ($\Omega = .80$), the use of the composite scale is supported.

The actual boundaries between informal periphery, conventional core and administrative clan are ill-defined and fluid, so *consent* really can be viewed as a continuous variable rather than a categorical variable. However, for analyses in which the categories are important — such as their relative proportions within workplace categories — a reasonable split can be made in which the informal periphery consists of workers whose *consent* scores are more than a standard deviation below the mean, and the administrative clan consists of workers whose *consent* score is more than a standard deviation above the mean. Table 1 reports these distributions across formal organizational positions, occupations and profit status, and includes the F statistic which tests for differences in means of the underlying *consent* score for each workplace category.

Panel A equates formal organization to Wright's (1978) formulation of social classes, effectively returning Wright's formulation to its origin as stratification




Figure 2. Measurement Model for Consent (Standardized Parameters)

Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Combined Data for Informal Organization Groups by Formal Structural Classifications, Occupations and Organization Type

Panel A. Class (per Wright)	informal periphery	conventional core	administrative clan	cases	consent mean
Non-Autonomous Worker	23.7%	70.5%	5.8%	224	25.98
Semi-Autonomous Worker	11.9%	71.9%	16.3%	135	26.78
Front Line Supervisor	16.2%	71.6%	12.2%	74	29.39
Lower Manager	8.0%	64.8%	27.3%	88	31.24
Upper/Middle Manager	4.7%	58.1%	37.2%	43	33.38
Large Employer-Capitalist	.0%	38.9%	61.1%	18	37.05
	15.5%	68.2%	16.3%	582	28.56
	F statistic for means 23.53** df 5				
Panel B. Occupation	informal periphery	conventional core	administrative clan	cases	consent mean
Managers	6.3%	61.1%	32.6%	95	32.69
Professionals	14.3%	64.3%	21.4%	84	29.18
Technicians	15.4%	80.8%	3.8%	26	25.88
Sales Workers	6.5%	71.7%	21.7%	46	30.49
Office Workers	20.2%	71.4%	8.3%	84	26.91
Service Worker	18.7%	65.3%	16.0%	75	27.68
Production Worker	9.9%	81.7%	8.5%	71	28.39
Laborer	26.7%	63.4%	9.9%	101	26.05
	15.5%	68.2%	16.3%	582	28.56
	F statistic for means 9.85** df 7				
Panel C. Organization Type	informal periphery	conventional core	administrative clan	cases	consent mean
Government (F,S,L)	21.2%	68.7%	10.1%	99	26.38
Private Company	13.4%	70.3%	16.4%	434	28.93
Not-for-profit	22.4%	49.0%	28.6%	49	29.77
	15.5%	68.2%	16.3%	582	28.56
	F statistic for means 6.47** df 2				

in the workplace. This panel demonstrates a relationship between formal and informal organization roughly depicted in Figure 1, where even workers at high formal positions have informal periphery-level *consent* scores, and workers at the lowest formal levels can have administrative clan-level scores. Managers and executives whose consent scores place them in the informal periphery might be considered examples of Hogan, Curphy and Hogan's assertion that the failure rate among executives is 50 percent and that the "base rate for managerial incompetence is between 60 and 70 percent." (1994:494) However, the basic trend in Panel A is the expected increase of the proportion of clan at increasing levels of formal organization and the increasing proportion of informal periphery at lower formal levels.

Panel B reports that the three occupations with the largest percentage of clan members are managers, sales and professionals, a result which demonstrates the importance of sales workers to the informal administrative networking of the organization. The occupation types with the lowest percentage of clan and highest percent periphery are laborers, office workers, service workers and technicians, a result which demonstrates that nonprofessional office workers (e.g., secretaries, receptionists and account clerks) and technicians (e.g., legal assistants and licensed practical nurses) now have lower standing than production workers.

Panel C reports that government and non-profit corporations have higher percentages of workers in the informal periphery than for-profit corporations do. In addition, the government has a lower percentage of people in the administrative clan while non-profit enterprises have the highest percentages of workers in the clan. This can be interpreted as supporting the assertion that profit-producing organizations are more concerned with generating consent than government corporations, and that workers in not-for-profit corporations are highly polarized, but these ideas need to be explored further.

MODELS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

The final step in this analysis is to construct a workplace model that includes the effects of informal organization on job rewards. This model (Figure 3) draws conceptually on typical models used for attitudinal studies (e.g., Leicht and Wallace 1994; Lincoln and Kelleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990), but differs in using the consent deal as a measure for position in the informal structure of the workplace, placed causally between structural job characteristics and outcomes.

The model starts with individual characteristics such as age, sex, race, education and marital status, and then adds the respondent's workplace characteristics such as corporation size, scope (local to international), organization type (i.e., government and not-for-profit corporation) and the industry concentration by sales — one of Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) measures of the effect of the corporation's environment. These individual and organizational characteristics




Figure 3. Workplace Model that Includes the Effects of Informal Organization on Job Rewards

are seen as influencing positional characteristics such as the level of technical change in the job, whether it is part time, the number of hours worked at home, the number of hours worked at other jobs, the substantive complexity, objective skill requirement (from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles), organizational tenure, union membership, and formal position (using Wright’s categories in Appendix 1). All of these are modeled as determinants of position in the informal organization as measured by the consent deal, and the results are reported in Table 2. The effects of formal position in the organization (Wright’s scale) are reported both for the individual strata and for all levels as a whole using a sheaf coefficient (Heise 1972).

Position in the informal organization appears to be primarily determined by job characteristics, though with an R^2 of only .29, the largest portion of the variance remains unexplained by structural factors in the model. The strongest effect comes from position in the formal organizational structure, followed by substantive complexity, job skill, and union membership. Other determinants such as being male, education, not working for government, and working in a competitive industry appear to be mediated through formal position as they drop out when formal structure is entered in the model, suggesting a somewhat meritocratic approach to informal stratification once formal stratification is controlled.

In the extended model, informal position is included among the determinants for three common work outcomes that are prominent in the literature: wages, job

Table 2. OLS Regressions of Informal Position on Individual, Organizational, Job Characteristics and Formal Structural Position

Full Models	Individual	Organization	Job	Formal Position
Individual characteristics				
Gender (female=1)	-.09*	-.09	-.09*	-.06
Race (white=1)	.03	.02	.00	.00
Age (by category)	.04	.06	.00	.01
Education (years)	.17**	.19**	-.02	.00
Marital status (married=1)	.03	.04	-.02	-.02
Organizational characteristics				
Employer size (by category)		-.02	.00	.00
Organization Scope (local-global)		-.04	-.02	-.02
Not-for-profit (=1)		.04	.02	.01
Government (=1)		-.12*	-.11*	-.07
Industry concentration (by sales)		-.12**	-.10*	-.07
Position and job characteristics				
Technological change			.03	.02
Part-time work			.03	.04
Hours at other jobs			-.03	-.02
Hours worked at home			.07	.03
Tenure with organization			.05	.02
Substantive complexity			.26**	.23**
Occupational skill (a)			.16**	.17**
Union Membership			-.12**	-.10*
Formal position: Wright's class				
Class: Large Employer (= 1)				.14**
Class: Large Manager (= 1)				.14**
Class: Small Manager (= 1)				.15**
Class: First Line Supervisor (= 1)				.10*
Class: Autonomous Worker (= 1)				-.10
Class Sheaf Coefficient				
				.27**
R ²	.04	.08	.23	.29
N = 537				

Note: Coefficients are standardized.

(a) From Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor).

(b) The reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (two tailed test)

Table 3. OLS Regressions of Work Identity, Job Satisfaction and Wages on Individual, Organizational and Position Characteristics

Full Models	Work Identity	Job Satisfaction	Wages
Individual characteristics			
Gender (female=1)	.01	.07	-.29**
Race (white=1)	.07	.10**	.02
Age (by category)	-.03	.05	.07*
Education (years)	-.06	-.01	.15**
Marital status (married=1)	-.01	-.03	.05
Organizational characteristics			
Employer size (by category)	.02	.01	.02
Organization Scope (local-global)	.01	-.01	.07*
Not-for-profit (=1)	.10*	-.03	-.02
Government (=1)	.07	.10*	-.10**
Industry concentration (by sales)	-.07	.02	.06*
Position and job characteristics			
Technological change	.07	.01	.01
Part-time work	.02	-.04	-.13**
Hours at other jobs	.07	.02	-.03
Hours worked at home	.00	-.07	.07*
Tenure with organization	.03	-.04	.09*
Substantive complexity	.17**	.22**	.08*
Occupational skill (a)	.02	-.03	.28**
Union Membership	.02	.01	.17**
Formal position: Wright's class			
Class: Large Employer (= 1)	-.02	-.0	.17**
Class: Large Manager (= 1)	.01	-.10*	.06
Class: Small Manager (= 1)	.01	-.13**	.04
Class: First Line Supervisor (= 1)	-.02	-.15**	.01
Class: Autonomous Worker (= 1)	.08	-.02	-.06
Class Sheaf Coefficient	.08	.17**	.20**
Informal position			
Consent	.24**	.59**	.09**
R ²	.17	.40	.60
N	537	537	512

Note: Coefficients are standardized.

(a) From Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor).

(b) The reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test)

satisfaction and worker identity (often referred to as work commitment). These results are reported in Table 3, and demonstrate that informal position exerts a strong effect on the job rewards tested in the model.

Position in the informal organization is the strongest factor influencing both the respondent's satisfaction with the job and subjective sense of identity as a worker. The results regarding job satisfaction are interesting in that informal position dwarfs the other significant factors – substantive complexity, formal position, being white, and working for government – a finding that suggests that in an economy transitioning from production to service and office work, job satisfaction in large organizations is derived more from informal workplace relationships than being intrinsic to the type of work performed. Another interesting result is that the substantive complexity, a subjective measure of the emphasis placed on skill, is significant while the objective measure of skill based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles is not. Finally, while the sheaf coefficient measures the magnitude of the effect of formal position, the direction is obvious based on the negative results of supervisors and managers relative to nonautonomous workers, indicating that less autonomy (or perhaps the responsibility that accompanies it) leads to satisfaction. The results for worker identity demonstrate that there are relatively few factors beyond informal position in this post-industrial era that make identity as a worker salient, only substantive complexity and working for a non-profit corporation.

The model for wages is particularly interesting. Many factors in the model are significant predictors of wages, with the strongest effects coming from being male, objective skill requirements, formal position, union membership, and education. However, the results show that the net effect of informal organization is almost half the effect of formal organization. It has the same effect as organizational tenure, and has more effect than substantive complexity, the differential for age, working in an organization that is broader in scope, working in a position which requires hours at home, and working in a more highly concentrated industry. Again, even with the controls for objective position and job characteristics, this effect on one of the most visible and objective work outcomes can only be interpreted as a very real manifestation of the informal and intersubjective side of the organization.

Conclusion

Consent, measured by the exchange of autonomy, voice and schedule flexibility by employers for organizational commitment by workers, creates an informal workplace stratification that mirrors traditional stratifications based on structural factors. As a product of the intersubjective world of the workplace, consent offers a finer resolution on the effects of the types of experiences that affect workplace attitudes and behaviors than traditional objective structural measures. Created

as a scale from survey data, it offers quantitative analysts an ability to study this intersubjective world across workplaces in ways that complement the findings of ethnographers and network analysts. This measure offers a large step in fulfilling Gouldner's call for reconciling the rational and natural systems models into a more powerful synthesis.

While the ethnographic data support the content validity of the scale and the Heise-Bohrnstedt validity statistic demonstrates that the additive scale adequately measures the underlying factor, determinations of construct validity can only be established through a process described by Bollen as testing whether the measure "relates to other observed variables in a way consistent with theoretically derived predictions" (1989:189). This study begins that process by demonstrating that the distribution of informal periphery and clan among occupations and by formal position complements, but does not duplicate formal structures. The workplace models continue it by demonstrating that informal organization exerts a dominant influence on subjective outcomes such as worker identity and job satisfaction, but also has an important influence on objective outcomes such as wages.

The proposed measure of consent and the connection between consent and informal organization is latent but not obvious in the workplace literature. Perhaps one of the virtues of this analysis is that it adds no new measures to the already long list of variables available for workplace studies. While it is no great news that some function of autonomy and commitment is highly correlated with much of what sociologists find interesting in the workplace, this repackaging of variables is an important reconceptualization of the workplace. It offers a reduction and clarification of existing models, and an opportunity to revisit existing data sets as well as develop additional new data to expand the study of consent and informal organization.

Subsequent analysis using consent should focus on other attitudes, perceptions, behaviors and outcomes. Models that include informal organization could shed light on how the intermix of subjective and structural factors influence perceptions of workplace relations, discrimination, promotion and pay equity, as well as broader perceptions such as the meaningfulness of the job and the rights of workers and management. Ultimately, it is hoped that this scale will round out workplace models, and facilitate the study of how workplace relations transcend organizational boundaries and affect worker attitudes on social factors not directly related to the workplace.

This study demonstrates the power of mixed methods research. Additional mixed methods research should identify other informal dynamics that have clearly observable effects within the overall workplace. Ethnographic observations of the workplace should include a search for measures that can be used in surveys and a discussion of the dynamics that can guide the construction of models by their more quantitative colleagues.

Notes

1. This study was conducted in accordance with procedures approved by the Bloomington Campus Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects, Bryan Hall, Room 10a, Bloomington, IN 47405-1219 under protocol #97-1509. A more detailed report of results is still being compiled. Family Finance Corporation is a pseudonym.
2. Discussion offered in this study revolves around my observations at FFC, but is augmented by years of observations during my prior career as a technician and manager of data processing systems.
3. I note again that my conflicting commitments to research and to FFC became a consideration in my getting laid off.
4. The clan informants who related this story to me were shocked by it, treating it as an example of despicable heresy.
5. Hackman and Lawler (1971) found high correlations between employee, supervisor and researcher ratings for job characteristics such as variety, autonomy and task identity. This has supported the use of worker perceptions as an approximation for objective measures.
6. These are computed using the communality and factor scores from SPSS's Principle Axis Factoring extraction method. Because Cronbach's α is known to be a lower limit, Heise and Bohrnstedt offer a more generalized reliability measure.

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Appendix 1. Definitions of Variables.

Standard responses are 1 =strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and 4=strongly disagree, with “neither agree nor disagree” not prompted. These are recoded to reflect higher levels of agreement, with “neither agree nor disagree” coded at 2.5. Means, standard deviations, alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees and no missing values for consent scale.

	Mean (stdev)
<i>Consent</i>	
Organizational commitment	
Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
1. <i>I am willing to work harder than I have to help my employer succeed</i>	3.48 (.70)
2. <i>I find that my values and my employer's values are very similar</i>	2.93 (.99)
3. <i>I am proud to be working for my employer</i>	3.34 (.80)
Computed as mean score. Reliability $\alpha = .70$	3.25 (.66)
Autonomy	
Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
1. <i>I have a lot of say about what happens on my job.</i>	2.91 (.91)
2. <i>It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my job gets done.</i>	3.38 (.85)
3. <i>My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my work</i> [this was dropped from full consent model]	3.16 (.93)
Computed as mean score. Reliability $\alpha =.66$	3.15 (.69)
Schedule flexibility	
<i>Please tell me how much say you have in the following areas</i> (1=a lot of say, 2=some say, 3=none at all; reflected for higher values to indicate greater say):	
1. <i>The days of the week you work.</i>	1.80 (.82)
2. <i>The time of day you work.</i>	1.83 (.76)
3. <i>The number of hours you work</i>	1.91 (.76)
Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that 1=1, 2=3, and 3=5) Reliability $\alpha = .79$	1.85 (.66)
Voice	
Agreement with statements (standard responses):	
<i>My job does not allow me to participate in important decisions that affect my organization.</i> (Not reflected so higher values indicate greater participation)	2.65 (1.03)

Consent
 Computed from confirmatory factor model path parameters as
 $\text{consent} = .5370 * \text{workhard} + .8946 * \text{myvalues} + .9038 * \text{iamproud}$
 $+ .6400 * \text{sayhours} + .7283 * \text{saydays} + .6387 * \text{saytime} + .7040 * \text{idecide}$
 $+ 1.4833 * \text{lotofsay} + 1.0000 * \text{partdecs}$. Reliability $\alpha = .74$

<i>Individual Characteristics</i>	
Female	Dichotomous variable (Female=1) .47 (.50)
White	Computed as a dichotomous variable (white = 1) from a question that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was 89.3% white. .88 (.32)
Age	Computed from year of birth. 39.28 (11.82)
Education	Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and grouped by attainment (1=high school, 2=some college, 3=college degree and graduate work) 13.71 (2.27)
Married	Computed as a dichotomous variable (married = 1) from a question that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced, separated, and never married. .59 (.49)

<i>Organizational Characteristics</i>	
Employer size	<i>How many people work for your employer at all locations?</i> Respondents who gave the exact number were assigned this number; respondents who gave a category response were assigned the category mean. Note: In 12% of the cases the survey staff obtained organization size through outside sources. 26119.8 (129505)

Continued

	Mean (stdev)
<p>Organization scope</p> <p>Respondents were coded at the broadest scope from the following: <i>Does the company (organization) you work for have more than 1 location in Indiana? Does your company (organization) have locations in other states? Does your company (organization) have locations outside the United States?</i></p>	2.63 (1.10)
<p>Not-for-profit</p> <p><i>In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed? (Not-for-profit = 1)</i></p>	.08 (.28)
<p>Government</p> <p><i>In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed? (Government = 1)</i></p>	.17 (.38)
<p>Industry concentration by sales</p> <p>Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they worked for, with a follow up question asking what product or service the company provided. These were coded to the 1990 Industrial Classification System using the <i>Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations</i>, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Industry environmental data such as the <i>concentration ratio in corporate sales</i> were appended by industry code based on data obtained from the <i>IRS Sourcebook: Statistics of Income, 1993. Corporate Income Tax Returns</i>. Missing values (i.e. from government organizations) were recoded to the sample mean to ensure that the cases are not excluded from the overall analysis but do not contribute to the analysis of this factor.</p>	50.53 (28.11)
<p>Position and Job Characteristics</p> <p>Technological change</p> <p><i>Since you began your present job, how much change has there been in the technology you use on your job? (1=very much, 2=some, 3=not very much)</i></p> <p>An additional volunteered category of "none" was added and responses were reflected to increase with increasing change.</p>	3.00 (.89)

Part-time work	Computed from <i>On average, how many hours per week do you work?</i> (1 = less than 35 hours)	.10 (.31)
Hours at other jobs	<i>On average, about how many hours per week do you work in all other jobs outside of your main job?</i>	2.17 (6.97)
Hours worked at home	<i>On average, about how many hours per week, if any, do you work at home doing things for your job?</i>	2.95 (6.52)
Organization tenure	<i>For about how long have you worked for your present employer?</i> Coded as years.	7.73 (9.08)
Substantive complexity	Computed from the following <i>How long does it take to learn the key aspects of your job?</i> (1=a few hours, 2=a day, 3=a few days to a week, 4=several weeks, 5=2 to 5 months, 6=6 months to a year, 7=a few years, 8=5 years or more) <i>My job requires a high level of skill.</i> (Standard agreement responses) <i>I am constantly learning new things on my job.</i> (Standard agreement responses)	5.04 (2.00) 3.23 (.86) 3.20 (.92)
Occupational skill	Computed as mean score (LEARNJOB/2, HISKILL, and LEARNING). Reliability $\alpha = .67$ Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which were then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution by occupational groups, see Table 1. Occupational averages were obtained for eight skill related measures (SEI, DOT data and people scores, average GED reasoning and math scores, specific vocational preparation, average education for occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree). These were computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale, which was recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale > 0) and low (scale < 0) skilled worker.	2.98 (.72) .01 (.87)

Continued

	Mean (stdev)
Union membership	Do you currently belong to a union? (Union = 1) .18 (.38)
<i>Formal Organizational Position</i> Based on Erik Wright's (1978) model of social class including "contradictory locations" based in ownership, supervision, and skills.	
Employer size	<i>How many people work for your employer at all locations?</i>
Organization type	<i>In your present job do you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-employed?</i>
Is a supervisor	<i>In your job, do you supervise the work of other employees?</i> (Supervisor = 1)
Number supervised	<i>How many people do you supervise directly or indirectly?</i>
Skilled occupation	As above, but recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale > 0) and low (scale < 0) skilled worker.
Formal Organization Position	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Non-Autonomous Worker</i>: not self-employed, non-supervisory, does not work in a "skilled" occupation 37.9% 2. <i>First Line Supervisor</i>: not self-employed and supervises 5 or less workers 23.8% 3. <i>Semi-Autonomous Worker</i>: not self-employed, non-supervisory or supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a "skilled" occupation 12.9% 4. <i>Lower Manager</i>: not self-employed and supervises between 6 and 20 people 15.2% 5. <i>Upper/Middle Manager</i>: not self-employed and supervises more than 20 people 7.5% 6. <i>Large Employer/Capitalist</i>: self-employed and employs 10 or more workers 2.9%

<i>Work Outcomes</i>					
Worker identity (often viewed as work commitment)	Agreement with statements (standard responses): 1. <i>My work is the main part of who I am.</i> 2. <i>I have other activities more important than my work. (this was coded for disagreement as high values)</i> 3. <i>My main satisfaction in life comes from my work.</i> Reliability $\alpha = .66$				2.49 (.56)
Job satisfaction	Uses standard satisfaction responses: 1. <i>All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job? (1 = not at all satisfied, 2 = not too satisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, 4 = very satisfied, and 5 = completely satisfied)</i> 2. <i>If you had to decide all over again, how likely is it that you would take the same job?</i> 3. <i>How likely is it that you would recommend this job to a good friend who was interested in a job like yours?</i> Reliability $\alpha = .79$				3.36 (.78)
Wage levels	<i>About how much will you earn from your main job this year?</i> Respondents who did not answer directly were asked a series of questions that attempted to categorize wage levels into the following: \$0–4999, \$5000–9999, \$10000–14999, \$15000–19999, \$20000–24999, \$25000–29999, \$30000–34999, \$35000–39999, \$40000–44999, \$45000–49999, \$50000–54999, \$55000–59999, \$60000–64999, \$65000–69999, \$70000–74999, and \$75000 or over. The IQES had a 96% response rate to this. All responses recorded into wage categories.				7.03 (3.62)

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